Dimensions of ‘socio’ vulnerabilities of advanced persistent threats. by Nicho, Mathew & McDermott, Christopher D.
NICHO, M. and MCDERMOTT, C.D. 2019. Dimensions of ‘socio’ vulnerabilities of advanced persistent threats. In 
Begušić, D., Rožić, N., Radić, J. and Šarić, M. (eds.) Proceedings of the 27th International software, 
telecommunications and computer networks conference 2019 (SoftCOM 2019), 19-21 September 2019, Split, 
Croatia. Piscataway: IEEE [online], article ID 8903788. Available from: 
https://doi.org/10.23919/SOFTCOM.2019.8903788  
Dimensions of ‘socio’ vulnerabilities of advanced 
persistent threats.  
NICHO, M. and MCDERMOTT, C.D.  
2019 
This document was downloaded from 
https://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
Dimensions of ‘Socio’ Vulnerabilities of Advanced
Persistent Threats
Mathew Nicho
College of Technology Innovation
Zayed University
Dubai, United Ara Emirates
mathew.nicho@zu.ac.ae
Christopher D. McDermott
School of Computing and Digital Media
Robert Gordon University
Aberdeen, United Kingdom
c.d.mcdermott@rgu.ac.uk
Abstract—Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are highly tar-
geted and sophisticated multi-stage attacks, utilizing zero day
or near zero-day malware. Directed at internetworked computer
users in the workplace, their growth and prevalence can be at-
tributed to both socio (human) and technical (system weaknesses
and inadequate cyber defenses) vulnerabilities. While many APT
attacks incorporate a blend of socio-technical vulnerabilities, aca-
demic research and reported incidents largely depict the user as
the prominent contributing factor that can weaken the layers of
technical security in an organization. In this paper, our objective
is to explore multiple dimensions of socio factors (non-technical
vulnerabilities) that contribute to the success of APT attacks
in organizations. Expert interviews were conducted with senior
managers, working in government and private organizations in
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over a period of four years
(2014 to 2017). Contrary to common belief that socio factors
derive predominately from user behavior, our study revealed
two new dimensions of socio vulnerabilities, namely the role
of organizational management, and environmental factors which
also contribute to the success of APT attacks. We show that the
three dimensions postulated in this study can assist Managers
and IT personnel in organizations to implement an appropriate
mix of socio-technical countermeasures for APT threats.
Index Terms—advanced persistent threats (APT), spear-
phishing, user vulnerabilities
I. INTRODUCTION
APT remains a formidable threat due to the integration of
‘Socio’ (non- technical) and technical threat vectors used for
reconnaissance, exploration, access, system exploitation, and
data exfiltration from systems. In this respect, APT is charac-
terized through the use of zero-day or near zero-day malware.
Multiple threat agents and advanced cyber techniques are
deployed to gain entry, escalate privileges, move stealthily,
target servers containing sensitive data, and undertake data
exfiltration, whilst remaining undetected over long periods of
time. APT threats by nature are stealthy, targeted and data
focused [1]. Detection is challenging using traditional defense
methodologies [2] as they tend to stay inside the network
or repeat intrusions multiple times, until they are able to
accomplish their goals [3]. As highly complex, sophisticated
and well-resourced threats, they are often aimed towards the
government sector [4] [5]. The goal of an APT attack is not just
to gather a target entitys data, but to accomplish it undetected
[6].
APTs often rely on social engineering attack vectors namely
spear-phishing and water-holing [7] [8]. In this respect, the
human factor is a critical element in an organizational com-
puter system, as it is a vulnerable link; the only factor that
exercises initiative, and the factor that transcends all the other
elements of the entire system [9]. Consequently, end users in
the workplace are said to be the weakest link in information
systems security [10] [11]. Motivated by this problem we
explore the dimensions of user related vulnerabilities (socio)
that largely contribute to APT attacks. In this paper the term
‘Socio’ is used to refer to non-technical vulnerabilities of APT
since the dimensions of ‘Socio’ are yet to be ascertained from
an APT context.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses
multiple perspectives of APT threats and attacks, to understand
their purpose and propagation. Section III explores existing
literature in relation to the ‘Socio’ aspect. Section IV outlines
the methodology used throughout the study. Section V presents
findings, with discussion, in the light of innovative facts,
presented in Section VI. Finally, conclusions, limitations and
areas of further research, are presented in Section VII.
II. APT PERSPECTIVES
APT attacks are highly targeted attacks with clearly defined
goals, which typically target governments or businesses, due
to their substantial intellectual property value [12] [13]. While
APT threats have drawn increased attention from the industrial
security community, a comprehensive and clear understanding
of the APT research problem is lacking [12]. The National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (NIST) described APTs as
“an adversary who possesses sophisticated levels of expertise
and significant resources, which allow it to create opportunities
to achieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors”
[14]. APTs target large corporations and foreign governments,
with the objective of stealing information or compromising
information systems. APTs are not usually deployed to bring
down a business, but to stay embedded within its systems
and extract information at a slow and undetected pace [15].
As highly advanced networked entities, typical of organized
groups, they conduct hostile cyber-attacks against connected
computers; if on a local network or the internet [13]. Using
stealth techniques, they aim to continuously monitor, admin-
istrate, and steal specific target data in the long term, while
staying undetected [16]. Thus, advanced persistent threats: (i)
pursue their objectives repeatedly over an extended period
of time; (ii) adapt to defenders efforts to resist them; and
(iii) maintain the level of interaction needed to execute their
objectives [12]. In this respect APTs are considered one of
the most vicious examples of a cyberthreat that are not easy to
detect or prevent. As APTs launch attacks in multiple domains
of the target information systems network, and in multiple
stages, using packets that may not be malicious, it is extremely
challenging for most current intrusion detection systems (IDS)
to detect them [17].
A. APT Attack Methodology
APTs use multiple attack techniques and tactics that are
executed with stealth and are targeted specifically to achieve
a defined goal, most often espionage, remaining inside the
network for a long time [8] [18]. Attacks are typically carried
out via communication channels such as email or instant
messaging by masquerading as legitimate and trustworthy
entities [19]. APTs follow a very precise attack type because
it employs indirect attacks on the terminals of the employees
working for the target, as well as direct attacks. For this reason,
it is very difficult to detect and handle an APT [20]. In contrast
to typical security incidents, these domestic and overseas
hacking attempts have occurred as a result of long-term and
persistent attempts, not by individual hackers but by groups,
for a special purpose of obtaining important information and
data about governments or specific companies [20].
While the APT process goes through six distinct phases (re-
connaissance, delivery, exploitation, operation, data collection,
and exfiltration) when targeting data [21], they also traverse
or target through one or more of the four planes ,namely
the physical plane (P), user plane (U), network plane (N),
application plane (A), or any other emerging planes [22].
Hence, APT require a holistic perspective.
III. ‘SOCIO’ VULNERABILITIES OF APT
Existing research has focused on generic intrusion detection,
with little application to APTs [13]. Hence, APT is a serious
issue for current detection methods because these methods
depend on known signatures of attacks, while APTs make
heavy use of unknown security holes for attacks [18]. The
defensive tools, procedures and other controls commonly
put in place to handle commodity security threats are often
ineffective against targeted APT-style attacks [23]. This is due
to the major role played by the human factor in the APT
propagation chain that paves the way for its initial entry into
the network.
Computer users being independent agents who make their
own choices, represent one of the most persistent vulnerabili-
ties in many computing systems [24]. Hence, phishers find it
easier to exploit humans rather than breaking into a system di-
rectly [25]. While news headlines tend to highlight wide-scale
attacks against large enterprises that hit millions of customers,
it has been shown that most attacks actually target small and
medium sized businesses, and often are much more costly
to smaller targets [26]. APTs which rely heavily on spear
phishing, find an easy path through human weaknesses. Spear
phishing (a major threat vector of APT) involves a deceptive
approach, whereby hackers acquire sensitive information from
targeted victims by appearing to come from a trusted source
[27]. In this respect, unintentional mistakes by users, due
to poor cybersecurity skills, results in up to 95 per cent of
cyber threats to organizations [28] Finally, the prevention and
detection of APT continues to be a challenge, due to attackers
constantly changing and evolving their advanced techniques
and methods to remain undetected [29].
IV. METHODOLOGY
Nine respondents directly managing information security
and governance in separate organizations, across multiple
sectors of industry (financial, media, information technology
services, government, aviation, and oil sector), were selected
for interview. Respondents were selected using five criteria
to ensure appropriate coverage of required topics. Criteria
consisted of organizational size (>100 employees); relevant
industry experience (ten years); relevant security and/or gover-
nance role within their IT department; industry-relevant certifi-
cations in the IS security domain (CISM, CISSP, ISO 27001);
and experience implementing at least one relevant information
security framework (ISO 27K, local ISMS, COBIT DS 5,
ITIL).
Interviews were transcribed, validated through subsequent
telephonic interviews, and imported to NVIVO 10 (qualitative
analysis software). Analysis followed guidelines proposed by
Whittaker [30], where (1) data (especially the interview data)
was coded, (2) transcribed text was systematically examined
to identify key concepts, (3) data was grouped into constructs
and (4) searched for relationships between a category/factors
and its concepts to view interrelationships.
V. FINDINGS
This section includes the first two steps of Whittaker namely
coding and identifying key concepts. In this respect 24 free
nodes were identified (see Table 1). Prior to getting answers
to the key research question, we elicited responses on the
multiple perspectives of APT.
Respondents were unanimous in their assertion that ‘zero
day’ attacks, inherent in APT threats, cannot be completely
prevented. Regarding commercial APT detection and preven-
tion solutions, respondents stated that “vendors may have APT
solutions for a simple attack vector of an APT. However,
they do not have a solution for every possible type of APT
attack vector”. The conclusion that “APT vectors can only be
controlled to some extent, but not 100 percent”, points to the
role of humans, whose behaviour is unpredictable compared
to systems. Word count suggested by Leech and Onwuegbuzie
[31] was used as a measure of relative emphasis, to rank
vulnerabilities being discussed by the respondents.
TABLE I
NON-TECHNICAL VULNERABILITIES MOSTLY ATTRIBUTED TO USERS
Non-Technical Vulnerabilities Sources /Frequency
Coverage
(words)
Management (9) 2469
Lack of knowledge on the
relevance to IT security
3/3 640
Lack of knowledge on IT
security
3/4 401
Risk management 2/2 333
Lack of resources 1/1 309
Audit focus 1/3 235
Lack of policies 1/3 182
Speed of delivery 1/1 150
Over confidence 1/1 141
Lack of monitoring 1/1 78
Employees (10) 1402
Employee mistakes 4/7 380
Lack of awareness of APT 2/5 257
Not reading communications 2/2 214
Unethical behavior 1/1 202
Low awareness of security
among non-IT staff
3/3 172
Low motivation 3/4 96
Accessibility vs Security 1/1 30
Issues with training 1/1 21
Not reading security policies 1/1 20
Consumer preference 1/1 10
Environmental (5) 253321
Multiple attack vectors 2/2 273
Online profiles 1/1 143
Lack of inter-vendor
communications
1/2 98
Low security research in
MENA region
1/1 57
Regulatory vulnerabilities 1/1 51
VI. DISCUSSION
This section describes the final two steps outlined by Whit-
taker, namely grouping of nodes under inductive constructs
and observation of relationships between constructs. Inductive
coding (constant comparison analysis) was used to identify
nineteen vulnerabilities, which were categorized into three
inductive themes (factors) namely management, employees
and environmental. Figure 1 illustrates the three dimensions
based on their relative weights. Contrary to statements and
assumptions in academic and practitioner fora regarding the
emphasis of the user as a conduit for APT attacks, we find
the overarching role of ‘management’ in APT attacks. In this
respect, ‘management’ refers to the decision-making body in
the upper middle and lower layers, with regard to information
systems. Secondly, the role of environmental factors is a
surprising finding in this study.
Environmental
14%
Employees 
31%
Management
55%
Fig. 1. Socio Vulnerability Dimensions of APT
A. Management
The role of management was discussed extensively by
respondents, compared to the remaining two themes, with
lack of knowledge particularly highlighted. Here, a lack of
knowledge is considered from two perspectives. First, a lack
of knowledge regarding the relevance of security by managers
which has been termed “revenue centric”. It was suggested
that priority is given to satisfy the customer in terms of time
and performance, resulting in security being compromised.
Second, a lack of knowledge on IT security has been termed as
“segmented security”. Here, security is viewed as an isolated
segment rather than a whole. In this respect IT personnel are
comfortable and assured of security in their own compartment,
but unware from a system perspective. This presents a serious
vulnerability when APT traverse through the six phases and
four planes (Section II-A).
A security plan starts with risk management and thus a
“risk profile with a threat matrix” is relevant. Occasionally,
managers cite a lack of resources in terms of money and
appropriate IT staff. In this respect “people dont have enough
resources to commit to security, because their focus is func-
tionality. . . . So, the weakness I feel is, again, number one first
give people resources, number two - find the right people, and
number three - retain them.” Analysis identified three issues
within this factor. The first being to simply pass the audit rather
than ensure security. Second, a complacency until the next
audit was conducted, and thirdly was the issue of ‘patching’.
An example is the use of. . .
“stand-alone products. If auditors ask to remove this
application, we raise it as a ticket to x. X says that it
is not a bug and hence we are not going to remove
it. We only provide a service like this if there is a
bug in it. They deny the request and we cannot touch
the product as it is a stand-alone product and hence
we only do the patching. This kind of risk is noted
as a known risk in the audit report and we do the
patching for this. This patch is not going to work for
long and is temporary only where the security risk
remans as such.”
To ensure robust security, policies should focus propor-
tionally on all three domains namely people, processes and
technology. Where managers focus on the functionality of
applications, rather than security testing, vulnerability will
exist. “Many managers dont think that a cyber security incident
will it affects them. They have this attitude that it wont affect
them. They somehow feel that for no valid reason, for no
justifiable reason that they are immune to all this.” Adequate
monitoring as part of “PDCA [Plan, Do, Check, Act] need
to be implemented” to ensure that security management is a
continuous process.
B. Employees
Employee mistakes are a major cause of APT attacks. In
this respect the respondents stated “while we have people,
processes and technology; people are the weakest link in the
information security.” Two weaknesses cited were “Naivety
that makes them trust people by default” and “attackers exploit
the fact that one person trusts the other”. Second, another
major issue cited by respondents was the lack of awareness
(detection) of methods used by APTs, which respondents
attributed to a lack of training. Two major issues highlighted
by respondents was the neglect of IT security communications,
and the lack of knowledge of security policies within the orga-
nizations. Regarding the latter, one respondent stated that there
was a tendency by employees to sign security policies (which
they are required to read and accept) without reading them.
Respondents signposted ‘unethical behavior’ by developers
finding and using short cuts, resulting in issues with password
management for network administrators. In this aspect two
factors may play a role. First is the management factor ‘speed
of delivery’ and second is the employee factor ‘accessibility
vs security’. Regarding the latter, one respondent attributed
blame to both the employees and management in their choice
and preference for speed and ease of access to information
in computer systems, over IT security. Issues with training
is linked to multiple factors across all three dimensions.
Respondents cited two major issues in this respect, namely the
current unattractive delivery of training currently utilised by
organizations (that makes the employees “disinterested”) and
the “dont care” attitude of employees towards training. Lastly,
consumers preference for fanciful gadgets (that can connect
to organizational networks) without knowing their inherent
security issues, was highlighted as providing an easy conduit
for APT vectors.
C. Environmental Factors
Two issues were cited in ‘multiple attack vectors’ namely
competency of the IS security manager and linked and inher-
ited privileges built into online applications. Regarding compe-
tency, which respondents termed as ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’
knowledge, a distinction was made whereby APT attackers
are experts in their own vector (vertical), whereas an IS
security manager has overall surface knowledge (horizontal) in
most of the known vectors. The second highlighted issue was
the default permissions built into applications by companies,
which generated major concerns within the IT domain of
organizations. Respondents highlighted ‘online profiles’ and
the ease with which hackers can gain information regarding
a person or organizations or its IT architecture, as another
major concern. Competition and rivalry among competing anti
malware vendors was highlighted as a major stumbling block,
since it restricts the sharing of information regarding ‘zero
day’ and APT threats. The fourth factor was a general lack
of research in cyber security in the Middle East and North
African (MENA) region, compared to North America, Europe,
East Asia and Oceania. Respondents had a final word of
caution to regulatory authorities. “IT products and services
vendors must comply with certain regulations of a specific
country where they are based.” However, standardization of
regulations may propose changes that may not be applicable
to specific products or services.
Analysis and evaluation of the factors highlighted inter-
relationships and overlap across factors and dimensions, such
that we find many cause and effect relationships to be present.
This is due to the inherent presence of people, processes and
technology to varying degrees in each of these factors, such
that it can be viewed from three dimensions. In this respect, the
three dimensions can provide managers with information on
formulating holistic strategies to combat APT threats without
forming a ‘weak link’ in any of the three dimensions.
VII. CONCLUSION
APTs penetrate organizational networks using ‘socio’, and
‘technical’ methods. Academic and commercial research sur-
rounding APT incidents largely depict the user as the promi-
nent weakness and conduit into a system, along with specific
technical vulnerabilities. As a result, there is a lack of research
surrounding the dimensions of the ‘socio’ (non-technical) fac-
tors that influence the user, which often result in unintentional
mistakes. This paper addresses this literature gap, and in doing
so presents two interesting and unique results. First, we present
the prominent role management play in IS decisions which
greatly contribute to the ‘socio’ aspect. Secondly, we also
present the unique role external factors play in the ‘socio’
aspect that indirectly promote APTs entry into organizational
systems.
Our study is not without its limitations. First, our study
focused only on the ‘socio’ vulnerabilities rather than the
countermeasures. Future studies on corresponding vulnerabili-
ties could enrich this domain. Second, we found cause and ef-
fect relationships between the factors in the dimensions which
we did not explore further. Future research could analyze the
intricate relationships found. Third, since only managers were
interviewed, not employees or computer users, bias could be
present in the responses. This could however form the basis
for further research in the area. The research in this paper
provides unique insights into the three dimensions namely
management, employees and environmental factors that can
be considered by organizations when planning, implementing,
and controlling APT threats.
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